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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, 
private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates 
achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics 
(combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) 
and suggests a framework for assessing the needs and efficiency of economic organizations 
and public interventions in agriculture.  
Our new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a 
governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of 
alternative market, contract, internal, and hybrid modes of governance; analysis of level of 
transaction costs and their institutional (distribution and enforcement of de-facto rights 
between individuals, groups, organizations), behavioral (agents preferences, ability, bounded 
rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, trust), dimensional (frequency, 
uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), natural, and technological 
factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms and other 
agrarian organizations; specification of the economic role of government and the needs for 
public interventions in agrarian sector; assessment of comparative of alternative forms of 
public involvement in agrarian sector (partnership, regulation, taxation, assistance, provision, 
in house organization, fundamental property rights modernization). 
The paper provides new powerful tools for understanding the agrarian organizations 
and their efficiency, and for improvement of public policies, collective actions, farming and 
business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life. 
 
Key words: market, private and public modes of governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian 
organizations, agricultural policies, transaction costs, New Institutional Economics  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of efficiency of economic organizations in general, and in agriculture in 
particular, has been among the most topical in academic, political, business and public 
debates in last several decades [Coase 1937; Eggertsson; Furuboth and Richter; Harvey and 
Sykuta; Sporleder; Williamson]. That issue has been especially important in transitional 
countries undertaking fundamental reforms in institutional and organizational structures of 
agrarian sector in the last 20 years [Csáki, C. and Lerman; Gortona and Davidova; Mathijs 
and Swinnen].  
                                                   
1 Correspondence should be addressed to Hrabrin Bachev, Institute of Agricultural Economics, 125 
Tzarigradsko Shose Blvd., Blok 1, 1113, Sofia, Bulgaria, e-mail: hbachev@yahoo.com 
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The problem of efficiency of agrarian organizations is usually simplified and limited to 
the “productivity of resources” (“factors of production”) in various types of farms. Moreover, 
comparisons are made of levels of efficiency across farms of different type, subsectors and 
countries independent to the specific economic, institutional or natural environment. Besides, 
question of efficiency is often politicized as unilateral priority given to a particular type of 
organization - free market, private farming, family farm, cooperative, public etc. In all this 
analysis, the public intervention is justified and called for to correct rare cases of market 
deficiencies – “tragedy of commons”, “negative externalities”, income disparities etc. 
Broadly applied traditional approach can not give an answer to the fundamental 
question: why there exist so many organizations of different type and size in a particular 
country, subsector etc. performing with a great variation in efficiency. For instance, in 
Bulgaria there have been highly sustainable “inefficient” organizations throughout transition 
now such as unproductive subsistence and semi-market farms, production cooperatives with 
profitability several times lower than private farms, inefficient contractual arrangements etc. 
[Bachev 2010a]. Neither the traditional approach is able to assess the effective needs and 
forms for public intervention or explain numerous “public failures” in the agrarian sector 
around the world. 
The New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics is a new developing 
methodology which explains existence and efficiency of economic organizations with their 
role to maximize transaction benefits and minimize transaction costs [Coase 1937; Furuboth 
and Richter; Williamson]. Divers market, private, contract, public, and hybrid modes are 
considered as alternative governance (rather than production) structures – forms for 
governing relations between different agrarian agents in a specific market, institutional, 
technological and natural environment.  
This paper incorporates achievements of that new developing interdisciplinary concept 
(combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) 
into analysis of agrarian organizations, and suggests a framework for assessing the needs 
and efficiency of economic organizations and public interventions in agriculture.  
The ultimate goal is to assist the understanding of agrarian organizations and their 
efficiency, and provide new tools for improvement of public policies, collective actions, 
farming and business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life.  
 
 
2. Why there are (so many) organizations is agriculture? 
 
The traditional approach  
 
Broadly applied traditional approach for evaluating efficiency of economic 
organizations is based on the assessment of efficiency of production costs and productivity of 
employed recourses. Accordingly, a great number of indicators are used to express the 
efficiency of an organization through “technical productivity” of factors (land, labor, capital 
etc.), rate of return (pay-back, profitability) on current and long-term expenditures etc.  
In more sophisticated (Neoclassical) models the criteria for assessment of efficiency of 
an organization is derived from the equilibrium condition of the entire economic system - 
when marginal benefits are equalized with the marginal costs [Pigou]. In such simplified 
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world the entire activity of individual agents (producers, consumers etc.) is effectively 
governed (coordinated, stimulated) by the singe free market mode. As Eggertsson pointes out 
“It is a central characteristic of welfare economics that outcomes derived from the basic 
neoclassical model are used as a criterion of efficiency. Outcomes that deviate from 
outcomes in model based on fully defined exclusive rights and costless transactions are 
called "inefficient" [Eggertsson]. 
According to the traditional approach, the organizations using recourses with different 
(higher, lower) from the marginal productivity are inefficient. For instance, if a farm has a 
higher productivity than the social level (employing resources more effectively than other 
organizations) but it does not further invest resources to explore the effective internal 
potential - then it is inefficient. Contrary, if a farm is performing with a lower productivity, it 
means that it integrates more recourses than it can effectively manage (which could be 
effectively used by others), and therefore it is inefficient.  
Furthermore, inefficiency of market and private modes is easily detected and 
effectively corrected though appropriate government interventions. Thus there is no 
economic rationality for market, private sector and/or public failures. 
The traditional approach does not answer the fundamental question: why there exist so 
many organizations with different productivity of resources utilization. If efficiency of a 
particular organization in low, there will always be a private or social mechanism 
(competition, public intervention) for reallocation of resources to more effective application - 
optimization, specialization, extension, or liquidation of that organization. In a foreseeable 
long run there will exist only “effective” organizations, which govern resources on (or close 
to) the socially acceptable level of efficiency.  
What is more, the traditional approach estimates different organizations without even 
looking for answering the question: why there exist so big variety (types) of economic 
organizations in agriculture - one-person farms, group farms, cooperatives, firms of different 
kind, subsistent farms, small and large farms, contractually or fully-integrated forms, public 
and hybrid modes etc.  
 
The new approach  
 
The New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics explains existence of diverse 
economic organizations in agriculture with their role to govern transactions between 
individual agents and economize on transaction costs [Harvey and Sykuta; Sporleder]. 
Carrying out individuals exchanges (land and labor supply; marketing of output and services 
etc.) is usually associated with significant (transaction) costs. For instance, there are costs for 
studying and complying with various institutional requirements (laws, standards, informal 
norms); for finding best prices and partners; for negotiating conditions of exchange; for 
contract writing and registration; for enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, 
controlling, measuring and safeguarding; for disputing, including through a third party (court 
system, arbitrage or another way); for adjusting or termination along with the evolving 
conditions of exchange etc. 
One of the fundamentals of the economic theory (and practices) is that division and 
specialization of labor, and related exchange and cooperation, open up enormous 
opportunities for increasing productivity and welfare of individuals and society. It let 
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producing additional value (better resource management, bigger output, maximum 
economies of scale and scope) and creates incentives for deepening individuals specialization 
and exchanges.  
However, the specialization and exchange is also associated with additional 
(transaction) costs. The genial insight of Coase that there are “costs of using the price 
mechanism” [Coase, 1937] reshaped fundamentally the modern economic thinking. The high 
costs of outside exchange make it more profitable to carry out division and cooperation of 
labor (a transaction) within an organization (firm, group farm etc.) instead across the market. 
For instance, a specialized livestock farm organizes internally a crop (forage) production 
activity (hiring additional labor and farmland) because of the significant costs and risks for 
market procurement of forage. 
Nevertheless, the internal management of transactions is also associated with costs (for 
directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; for coordination and controlling activity of 
partners) which restricts unlimited expansion of the borders of an (internal) organization. 
Thus a transaction (activity) will be carried in an organization if the costs are lower than for 
governing that transaction across market or in another organization.  
Consequently, the distribution of overall (agrarian) activities between different farms, 
agrarian organizations, and markets will be determined by the comparative costs for using 
various governing arrangements as the most efficient one(s) (minimizing internal and 
external transaction costs) will tend to prevail [Bachev 2004]. Ultimately, emergence, 
existence, evolution and the size of any free choice (contractual) economic, professional, 
political etc. organization could be explained by transaction cost minimizing (rather than 
technological) reason [Williamson].  
The “discovery” of transaction costs significantly changed the way the economic 
problem (the “effective allocation of resources”) is addressed and solved. As Dahlman 
underlines it: “Indeed it is obvious that once there is shift from a “frictionless” universe scare 
resources have to be used to effect transactions, protect property rights and so on. This means 
that system’s total resource endowment can no longer be devoted solely to the production of 
normal commodities” [Dahlman].  
Thus, the economic efficiency of agrarian organizations should take into account not 
only their capacity to minimize production costs, but also their ability to economize on 
transaction costs. While the production costs could be defined as cost associated with proper 
technology (“combination of production factors”) of certain farming, servicing, 
environmental conservation etc. activity, the transaction costs are the costs for governing the 
economic and other relations between individuals (for coordination of activity, for protection 
and exchange of various rights etc.). Moreover, both (current) costs for using the individual 
economic organizations and the long-term costs for their development (initiation, 
maintenance, modernization, liquidation) have to be taken into account [Bachev 2004]. 
If execution of activity and exchange was not associated with transaction costs (“world 
of zero transaction costs”) then the mode of organization would have no economic 
importance [Coase; Williamson]. Individuals would govern their relationships with the same 
(equal) efficiency though free market (adapting to price movements), and private modes of 
different types (contracts, firms), and collective decision making (cooperative, association), 
and in a nationwide hierarchy (a single private or state company). Then technological 
opportunities for economies of scale and scope (the maximum productivity of resources, 
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“internalization of externalities”) would be easily achieved [Coase 1960]. All information for 
the effective potential of transactions (optimization of resources, meeting various demands, 
respecting assigned and transferred rights) would be costlessly available to everybody, and 
individuals would costlessly define new rights, and protect their (absolute2 and contracted) 
rights, and trade owned resources (and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the 
possibilities for increasing productivity (situation known as “Pareto optimum/efficiency”). 
However, often the high transaction costs make it difficult or block otherwise efficient 
(mutually beneficial) for all parties activity and exchange. For instance, despite the great 
pay-off of investments in agrarian research and innovation, the market and private agents do 
not organize such activity in a sufficient scale because of their high uncertainty and low 
market and private appropriability [Bachev and Labonne].  
Since carrying out agrarian activity is connected with transaction costs, the rational 
agent will seek, chose, and develop such modes for organization of his activity and 
exchanges which maximize his transacting benefits and minimize associated costs.  
The type of economic organization becomes crucial since various forms give unequal 
possibilities for participants to explore technological opportunities (economies of scale and 
scope, non-separability of activity), coordinate and adapt transactions, stimulate an 
acceptable behavior of others (counterparts, dependents), protect their rights and investments 
from unwanted expropriation. Therefore, in the long-run inefficient forms will be abandoned 
and only effective modes for organization of agrarian activity and exchange will dominate. 
Transaction costs minimizing helps us understand the reason of emergence and the 
efficiency of a great variety of agrarian organizations in the modern world – the economic 
boundaries of farms (“make of buy decision”; the extend of internal division and 
specialization, and product diversification); divers contractual arrangements and type of 
coalitions (partnerships, firms, cooperatives); economic needs for cooperation with 
competitors (in inputs supply, marketing, lobbying etc.) or vertical (downstream, upstream) 
counterparts; joint ventures; pace and limits of development of agrarian markets etc.  
What is more, the efficiency of a particular organization can hardly be assessed without 
analyzing the efficiency of complementary and/or competing organization(s). For instance, 
the “high” efficiency of small-scale farms and the producers (inputs supply, marketing) 
organizations in most countries can not be properly evaluated without analyzing their high 
complementarities3. Furthermore, depending on the dominating public organizations (public 
provision, support measures, tax preferences etc.), the individual market and/or private 
organizations would have quite dissimilar efficiency for different agrarian agents.     
 
Factors for organizational choice 
 
Different governance forms are alternative but not equal modes for organization of 
transactions - they have different features (advantages and disadvantages) to coordinate, 
control, and stimulate (maximize benefits of, minimize costs on) transactions [Williamson]. 
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand of 
                                                   
2 determined by dominating institutional environment [Furuboth and Richter]. 
3 e.g. the high efficiency and sustainability of small scale subsistence and semi-market farms, and 
production cooperatives in transitional Bulgarian agriculture [Bachev 2004]. 
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market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from 
specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with a high 
uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing an 
opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc.  
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of activity. However, it may require large costs for 
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions, 
enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control on 
activity (direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). 
However, extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries 
(allowing achieving the minimum technological or agronomic requirements; exploration of 
technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
Besides the transaction costs, the choice of economic organization depends on a 
number of additional factors (Figure 1): 
- personal characteristics of individual agents – preferences, ideology, knowledge, 
capability, training, managerial experience, risk-aversion, reputation, trust, power etc. For 
instance, farming organization is often restricted to a family partnership. In some cultures, 
the cooperative is the preferred mode of agrarian organization. If farmer is a good manager 
he will be able to design and control a bigger organization managing effectively more 
internal (labor) and outside (market and contract) transactions. A risk-taking farmer will 
prefer more risky but productive forms - e.g. bank credit for a new profitable venture). When 
counterparts are family members (or close friends) there is no need for complex organization 
since relations are easily “governed” by the good will and mutual interests of parties. 
Benefits for farmers could range from monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect 
revenue; pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; enjoyment in agricultural 
activities; desire for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or cultural heritage 
preservation; increased leisure and free time; to other non-economic benefits4. 
- formal and informal institutions (“rules of the game”)5. Often the choice of governing 
mode is (pre)determined by the institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying farming 
activities, land and labor supply, trade of output etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal6. 
                                                   
4  A “desire for preservation of farm for future generation” has been a major reason for the persistence 
(sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan [Bachev and Tsuji]. 
5 that is the distribution of rights and obligations between individuals and groups, and the system(s) of 
enforcement of these rights and rules [North]. The spectrum of rights could embrace material assets, 
natural resources, intangibles, certain activities, labor safety, clean environment, food security, intra- and 
inter-generational justice etc. A part of the rights and rules are constituted by the formal laws, regulations, 
standards, court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules and rights determined by the 
tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms etc. The enforcement of various rights and 
rules is done by the state (administration, court, police) or other mechanisms such as community pressure, 
trust, reputation, private modes, self-enforcement etc.  
6 Nevertheless, when costs associated with the illegitimate governance is not high (possibility for disclosure 
low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, then the more effective modes 
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For instance, corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many 
countries; market trade of farmland, natural resources, and some outputs (inputs) is 
illegitimate, private management of natural ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not allowed 
etc. What is more, the institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction 
costs7 and thus the choice of one or another economic organization. In conditions of 
well-working public system of regulations (quality standards, price guarantees) and laws and 
contract enforcement, a preference is given to spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. On 
the other hand, when rights on major agrarian resources are not defined or not well defined, 
and absolute and contracted right effectively enforced, that lead to domination of primitive 
subsistence farming, informal, personal and over-integrated forms, unsustainable 
organizations, undeveloped and missing markets etc [Bachev 2004]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Factors affective organizational choice in agriculture 
 
- natural and technological factors. In rare cases there is only one practically possible 
form for governance of agrarian activity. For example, in Japanese dispersed paddy 
agriculture water supply could not have been conducted by individual farmers (high 
interdependency, nonseparability of water use) and since earliest period water use 
organization developed as a public project [Mori]. An effective governance of some 
                                                                                                                                                            
prevail – large gray or black sectors of the economy are common in agriculture around the globe. 
7 A good example in this respect are current problems of many Bulgarian farms to meet the new EU 
requirements (“institutionally determined” costs) related to new product quality, food safety, labor, 
environmental, animal welfare etc. standards [Bachev 2010a]. 
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environmental activities also requires a certain scale and thus collective actions at local, 
regional, national or transnational scale [Bachev 2010a]. However, beside few examples, in 
farming is almost impossible to find cases where the form of governance is unilaterally 
determined by the natural and/or technological parameters8.  
Nevertheless, technological development affects enormously the structure and level of 
transaction costs [North]. For instance, mechanization and standardization of farming 
operations (products) increases manageability and leads to extension of activities under a 
singe management enlarging internal (internal division and specialization of labor) and 
outside (market and contract procurement, trade, cooperation) transactions9. Furthermore, the 
possibilities that progression of modern production (e.g. precision farming), transportation, 
measurement, information, communication etc. technologies gives to coordinate and 
intensify transactions and minimize related costs are immense - easy assessment and 
traceability; on line information, coordination, monitoring, detecting, advise; direct low costs 
exchanges (expressing demands, finding best prices and partners, negotiating, trading, 
disputing) and collective actions (coalitions) of interested agents at national and international 
scales; rapid detection of problems and interventions by governments and international 
agencies; full participation of individuals in and control on public decision-making etc. 
Each activity (transaction) has different specific dimensions varying according to the 
specific institutional environment (legislation, efficiency of laws and contract enforcement, 
diverse informal restrictions), personal characteristics of agents (preferences, experience, 
reputation, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion), macroeconomic conditions (stability, 
foreign trade regime, available public support), dominant technologies (mechanization and 
standardization of operations, application of information technologies), and natural 
environment (recourses endowment, dependency) etc.  
There exist no singe most efficient (universal) form for organization of all agrarian 
activity in all practically possible economic, institutional and natural settings. According to 
the critical dimensions of activity and exchange the individual agents will (tend to) use the 
most appropriate (effective) mode for governance. Hence, in any particular moment the 
agrarian activities will be carried out (governed) through a great variety of economic 
organizations: some will be governed by the “invisible hand of market”, some will be carried 
out through a special contract mode (“private order”), some will be managed within 
hierarchy (under "visible hand of manager"), some will be supported by a third party 
(Government, NGO`s, international assistance), some would require more complicated and 
mixed modes [Bachev 2004].  
Consequently, it must be abandoned commonly used (Nirvana) approach for evaluating 
different forms as “good” or “bad” for their own or in a comparison with some non-feasible 
(ideal, institutional and transaction costs free, in other countries etc.) model. The evaluation 
                                                   
8 Exploration on technological economy of scale and scope is usually pointed out as a factor determining 
type of organization. However, development of technology commonly follows demand and is a 
changeable parameter as well. Besides, the maximum economy of size and scale can be reached through a 
market exchange with a specialized activity and/or resources rather than integrating transactions. 
9  However, that enormous technological potential meets the restrictions of imperfect institutional 
arrangements which eventually slow-sown technological progress, impede individual market and private 
transactions, allow particular agents to benefits from the status-quos, and lead to unsustainable 
“development” [Bachev 2010a]. 
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is to be directed to finding out the comparative advantages for initiating, establishing, using, 
management, adaptation, intensification, coordination, stimulation and controlling (in short - 
for minimization of overall costs) of the alternative (and really possible) modes of 
governance in the specific market, institutional, technological and natural environment.  
For instance, in post-communist transitional conditions of not well-defined and 
assigned private rights on farmland, and the high costs for their protection and exchange, the 
short-term lease and the internal integration (subsistence and semi-market farming, 
production cooperation) were the most efficient forms for organization of land supply in 
Bulgarian agriculture [Bachev and Tsuji]. 
The evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations has to include not only the 
comparative “productivity” of resources, but analyses of the level and structure of 
comparative transacting costs. Besides, it should identify the factors of transaction costs in a 
nationwide (social) scale, which eventually slow down sustainable growth of agriculture, and 
lead to insufficient and unsustainable use of resources, underinvestment and low productivity 
in production, wide-spreading of primitive technologies, lack of innovations etc [Bachev 
2004].  
 
Public policy implications  
 
The recognition of transaction costs has also a number of important policy implications 
related to economic needs and efficiency of public intervention in agrarian sector:  
First, public (government) role is to establish organizations facilitating and intensifying 
market and private transactions and minimizing related costs - for identification, protection, 
and disputing individual absolute and contracted rights (e.g. notary register, court, police 
etc.); quality, labor, environmental etc. standards; appropriate market infrastructure 
(wholesale markets, market and price information) etc.  
Second, when a high level of costs for market and private transactions (which prevent 
or entirely block development of effective market and private forms) is observed then public 
(government) is to intervene to make that socially desirable activity (and exchange) possible 
or more efficient. 
Third, different forms of public intervention (assistance, regulations, funding, provision, 
partnership) are not with equal efficiency since they have different potential to deal with the 
specific market and private sector failures and command different (implementation and 
transaction) costs. Thus, the comparative efficiency of feasible forms of public intervention is 
to be assessed and the most efficient one selected. 
Forth, “market failure” does not automatically imply a public intervention. There are 
numerous private and collective forms which effectively overcome market deficiency. When 
there is a situation of market and private sector failure there is a need for public intervention. 
However, public involvement in market and private activity is to be undertaken only if there 
is a net benefit (saving on transaction costs) compared to total costs of public intervention. 
Therefore, the choice is always between practically available “imperfect social 
arrangements”. 
 Finally, “public failure” is a feasible outcome and when there is a need for public 
intervention the induced public organization is not always efficient due to misuse of power 
by certain groups, bad design, mismanagement etc. 
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3. Steps in analysis of agrarian organizations 
 
The basic unit of analysis 
 
The New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics turns the individual 
transaction and the costs associated with it into a center of the economic analysis 
[Williamson].  
Following that new approach first, we have to determine the major type of transactions 
in which the agent managing agrarian activity (farm entrepreneurs, farmers) participates 
(Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1. Steps in analysis of economic organization in agriculture 
 
Second, we are to identify the alternative (feasible) forms for governing of agrarian 
transactions.  
Third, we have to specify factors of transaction costs, and the costs (and benefits) 
associated with the alternative modes of economic organization.  
Fifth, we are to assess the comparative efficiency of alternative modes, and define the 
effective boundaries of market and private organizations. 
Six, we have to identify cases of market and private failures, and the needs for public 
intervention in agrarian sector. 
Seven, we have to identify the alternative (and feasible) forms for public intervention in 
agrarian sector. 
Finally, we have to assess the comparative efficiency of alternative modes of public 
intervention, and select the best one(s).    
The main types of transactions of a farm entrepreneur are associated with the supply of 
Specifying types of agrarian transactions
Assessing comparative efficiency of generic modes of governance
Determining effective boundaries of market and private organizations 
Specifying alternative forms of public intervention 
Identifying alternative forms of agrarian governance 
    Determining factors of transaction costs, and costs (benefits) of different modes 
Assessing comparative efficiency of feasible modes of public intervention 
Identifying needs for public intervention 
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“factors” of production and the marketing of farm output and services. Actually, the farm 
manager manages not (production) technology but transactions related to agricultural 
production. It is not a hypothetical case when an entrepreneur is entirely engaged in 
managing agrarian transactions rather than farming activity.  
The major types of transactions in farming are commonly associated with:  
- labor supply,  
- supply of land and other natural resources,  
- service supply,  
- inputs supply,  
- knowledge supply,  
- innovation supply,  
- finance supply,  
- insurance supply,  
- marketing of services and products.   
In addition, the farm entrepreneur takes part in a great variety of collective actions for 
inducing public (Government) intervention in market and private sector in his own interests. 
[Bachev 2010a]. 
Usually, every agrarian activity and exchange could be governed through a great 
variety of alterative forms. One extreme for the farm manager is to specialize exclusively in 
governing of market transactions rather than production management. For example, 
leasing-in farmland and long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and 
harvesting of output, buying needed short-term material assets, selling all primary products 
on market. 
Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-person or group subsistent 
farm – the farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, labor, technological knowledge) and 
consume the entire product.  
Between these two polls there is a spectrum of feasible modes for governing of agrarian 
activity and exchange: various sort long-term contracts, association, cooperation, interlinked 
organization, hybrid forms, farms of different type (partnerships, corporations, complex 
hierarchies) etc.  
For instance, cultivation of land by a tractor can be governed in numerous ways: a 
farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a tractor (input and credit 
supply interlinked contract); farmer could buy cultivation service from market (contract 
service); a number of farmers may buy a tractor (joint ownership) and use it in a group 
(producers cooperative) or individually; a farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation 
services (non for profit organization); a farmer may lease the land out to a tractor owner and 
share the output (share tenancy contract); a farmer can hire a tractorist to work on farm 
(employment contract), and may even sell out the cultivation service to market (profit 
making organization); cultivation service to farms could be subsidized by the Government 
(trilateral mode), or provided by a municipality or a state company (public organization). 
Identification of practically employed or other feasible specific forms for organizations 
of transactions in different countries, regions, subsectors etc. is object of a special 
micro-economic survey. For instance, major forms for organizations in functional areas of 
Bulgarian farms are summarized on Figure 3. 
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Alternative modes of organisation Functional areas 
Market Special contract Special 
organization 
Supply of 
management 
na Employment contract with guaranteed 
minimum salary and output-based bonuses 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
Supply of land and 
other natural 
resources 
Purchase 
Short-term lease 
Long-term lease with a fix rent  
Long-term lease with a share rent 
Long-term lease with a market rent 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
 
Labor supply Daily hire 
Seasonal hire 
 
Permanent labor contract with a fix 
remuneration 
Permanent labor contract with result based 
payment 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Supply of 
short-term 
material assets 
Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term procurement contract 
Supply contract interlinked with a credit 
supply, service supply, and/or marketing of 
farm produce 
Cooperation 
Supply of 
long-term material 
assets 
Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term lease contract 
Contract for purchase interlinked with 
crediting (leasing) and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Service supply Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with other 
services, products or crediting 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Innovation and 
know-how supply 
Purchase with spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Free consultation in the 
farm advisory system 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with supply of 
material assets and/or crediting 
Cooperation 
 
Financing Bank loan 
Loan from an individual 
agent 
Loan from a private 
organization 
Co-investment 
Crediting interlinked with supply of material 
assets and services 
Contract with a public funding program  
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Insurance Purchase of insurance 
Purchase of “assurance 
service” 
Insurance contract interlinked with material 
assets 
Long-term insurance contract 
Cooperation 
Marketing of 
products and 
services 
Retail sale 
Wholesale trade 
Standard contract 
 
Long-term contract for marketing 
Marketing contract interlinked with crediting, 
supply of material assets and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Figure 3. Principal forms of organizations for functional areas of Bulgarian farms 
 
“Measurement” of transaction costs 
 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations is the direct 
comparison of costs for each transaction in different forms. The organization which requires 
less costs is more efficient. For instance, a comparison is made whether would be more 
economical to marketing of output directly or to use a marketing cooperative.  
Data for some part of transaction costs can be found in traditional statistics and 
accountancy (e.g. management costs, marketing costs, insurance etc.). Another part of the 
transaction costs may be easily specified – e.g. costs for licensing and registration, 
agro-market information, promotion and marketing of output, general management, hiring 
lawyers and court suits, guarding property and yields, payment of bribes etc.  
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However, a significant portion of the transaction costs is either very difficult (too 
expensive) or impossible to be determined. In that group we can include the costs for finding 
best partners, negotiation, controlling and enforcement of contractual terms, organizational 
development, interlinked transacting, unrealized (failed) deals etc.  
Besides, it is often extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from the 
traditional production expenditures10. For example, while executing farming operations a 
farmer supervises the hired labor; during transportation of chemicals he negotiates the 
marketing of output etc.  
Approximate estimate for the level of transaction costs could be made by interviewing 
farm managers. Here it is essential to indicate the level (high, low) of efforts and time 
devoted for governing different type of transactions: for finding needed labor for hiring, land 
and material inputs for purchase and lease-in; negotiating terms of exchange; monitoring 
implementation of contractual obligations; current adaptation of contracts to emerging new 
conditions; conflicts resolution; memberships in professional organizations; relationships 
with agrarian bureaucracy etc. 
Nevertheless, a component comparison of the transacting costs could not always give 
idea for the efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of 
costs while increasing another type transacting costs – e.g. internalization of a transaction 
(replacement of market with integral mode) is associated with the reduction of costs for 
information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along with 
constantly changing conditions, and safeguarding investments from the outside opportunism. 
On the other hand, it enlarges costs for the organizational formation, decision making, 
integral management, supervising and motivation of hired labor etc. In our previous example 
with the alternatives for marketing of farm output the “internal realization” (personal 
consumption, production “consumption”, processing) could be chosen as more efficient form 
to the direct sell or use of an marketing cooperative.  
Moreover, a good part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but 
through complex or interlinked modes - e.g. inputs supply in a “package” with know-how, 
extension or/and service supply; a joint supply of inputs and credit; crediting of production 
against marketing of output etc. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the overall 
(total) costs for organization of transactions of different types - all external and internal 
transaction costs of the farm [Bachev 2004]. 
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high transacting 
costs entirely block development of an alternative organization. For instance, markets for 
agrarian credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the transition and the internal 
supply (utilization of own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible form 
for finance supply of farms [Bachev and Tsuji]. Here the comparative level of transaction 
costs is impossible to be determined and appreciate the “high” efficiency of the integral mode 
for financing. In that case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are not real 
alternative at all but completely different governing structures. Thus, broadly applied 
indicators for estimation of comparative efficiency of investments based on “opportunity 
costs” (discounting, payback period, internal rate of return) independent from the form of 
                                                   
10 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical 
models simply by adding a new "transacting" activity [Furuboth and Richter]. 
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funding, have no significant economic sense. 
 
Factors of transaction costs 
 
Another direction for evaluation of the efficiency is the Discrete structural analysis of 
alternative economic organizations [Williamson].  
Since it is either very difficult or impossible to determine the transaction costs for 
individual mode, the assessment is made on the comparative costs of alternative 
organizations. Besides, the quantitative approach (the absolute and relative measures, 
marginalism) is replaced by the qualitative (structural) analysis and indirect assessment of 
transacting costs. Actually, we are interested not in the absolute level of transaction costs in 
different form, but in organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular 
transaction (activity).  
Initially we have to identify the critical factors of transactions in the specific market, 
institutional and natural environment. These factors are responsible for the variation of 
transacting costs and are associated with:  
- the behavioral characteristics of agrarian agents such as bounded rationality, 
tendency for opportunism, reputation building, risk taking, level of trust, etc.;  
- the economic dimensions of individual transactions such as frequency, uncertainty, 
assets specificity, and appropriability. 
The transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
opportunism [Williamson].  
Agrarian agents do not possess full information about the economic system (price 
ranges, demands, trade opportunities, development trends) since collection and processing of 
such information would be either very expensive or impossible (for future events, partners 
intention for cheating). In order to optimize the decision-making they have to spent costs for 
“increasing imperfect rationality” – e.g. data collection, analysis, forecasting, training etc. 
Furthermore, the economic agents are given to opportunism. Accordingly, if there is 
opportunity for some of transacting sides to get non-punishably an extra rent from the 
exchange he will likely do so. Two major forms of opportunism can be distinguished: 
pre-contractual ("adverse selection") - when some of the partners use the "information 
asymmetry" to negotiate better contract terms; and post-contractual ("moral hazard") - when 
some counterpart takes an advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by 
another partner or by a third party) or when he takes "legal advantages" of unpredicted 
changes in transacting conditions (costs, prices, regulations etc.).  
A special third form of opportunism occurs in development of larger organizations 
[Olson]. Since individual benefits are often not proportional to the individual efforts, 
everybody tends to expect others to invest the costs for organizational development, and to 
benefit ("free ride") from the new organization. 
It is very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic 
behavior (because of the bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents have to protect their 
transactions from the hazard of opportunism through: ex ante efforts to find a reliable 
counterpart and to design efficient mode for partners credible commitments; and ex post 
investments for overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of 
possible opportunism during contract execution stage [Williamson]. 
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In addition, the transaction costs depend on “critical dimensions” of each transaction. 
When recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, both (all) sides are 
interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, 
building reputation, setting up incentive and adjustment mechanisms, conflict resolution 
devices etc.). Here continuation of the relations with a particular partner and designing a 
special mode for transacting has a high economic value. Parties restrain for opportunism 
which detection is “punished” by turning to a competitor (losing future business). Besides, 
costs for development of a special private mode for facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) 
exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange. 
When a transaction is incidental then possibility for opportunism is great since cheating 
side can not be easily punished (good reputation is not of value). Transaction costs become 
very high (and may block transacting) when low frequency coincides with high uncertainty 
and requirement for large relation-specific investments. 
When uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for carrying out 
and secure the transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding 
against risk etc.). Since bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerged agrarian 
agents will seek, develop, and use such modes of organization which diminish transaction 
uncertainty. While certain risks could be diminished or eliminated by a production 
management or through a special market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance) most transacting 
risk would require a special private forms – e.g. trade with origins; providing guarantees; 
using share-rent or output-based compensation; employing economic hostages; participating 
in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply or marketing cooperative; a complete integration. 
There are strong mutual incentives to develop a special form for repeated transacting 
when high uncertainty is combined with significant relation specific investments. When 
transacting between same counterparts is rare, and it is not supported by specific assets, and 
appropriability of rights is high, then faceless (autonomous) market exchange is the most 
efficient mode. Depending on the levels of uncertainty and the risk aversion agrarian agents 
will take different entrepreneurial risk and will get normal, low or above the average rate of 
return from the transactions. 
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with a 
particular partner are to be deployed11. In this case it is impossible to change a partner of 
transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of the specific capital.  
The relation specific (dependent) investments are "locked" in transactions with a 
particular buyer or seller (the personality of the partner matters), and cannot be recovered 
through a "faceless" market trade. A costless redeployment (alternative use) of the specific 
assets is not possible if transactions fail to occur, they are prematurely terminated, or less 
favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal time and before the end of the life-span 
of specific capital).  
Therefore, dependant investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a special form such 
as a long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, quasi or 
complete (ownership) integration. Often, the later is quite expensive, the investment in 
                                                   
11 Specificity is not a technological but transacting characteristic of assets. In one situation a particular capital 
(investment) could be highly universal (an easy deployment to another internal usage or outside trade) while in 
others - highly specific (a big dependency from the relations with a certain counterpart (buyer, seller, coalition 
partner). 
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specific capital are not made, and the activity either can not take place or occurs without (or 
loss of) comparative advantages in respect to productivity 
If a symmetrical assets dependency (regime of a bilateral trade) exists there are strong 
incentives in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. However, when 
unilateral dependency exists then the dependent side (facing mini or total monopoly) has to 
protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty or certainty) either 
through integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, cooperative); or 
safeguarding them with interlinked contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of 
collective organization to outstand asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying 
for Government regulations) etc. 
Serious transacting problems arise when the condition of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty and a low frequency of transactions. In this case the elaboration of a 
special governing structure for private transacting is not justified (set up costs can not be 
recovered by occasional transaction). The specific investments are not made and the 
transactions (and activity supported by them) fail to occur. Therefore, a third party 
involvement (local authority, Government agency, NGO, hybrid organization) in individual 
transacting (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) is crucial for smooth organization of 
such transaction.  
The activity and transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on 
products, services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of the agrarian 
intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new varieties 
and technologies, software etc. Besides, all products and activities with significant (positive 
or negative) externalities are to be included in this group [Bachev and Labonne].  
If appropriability is low the possibility for unwanted (unequal) market or private 
exchange is great, and the costs for protection (safeguard, detection of cheating, disputing) of 
private rights and investments extremely high. Because of the bounded rationality, the costs 
for protection, detection, verification, and a third-party (e.g. court) punishment of unwanted 
exchange (non paying consumers-opportunists) extremely high.  
For transactions with low appropriability the costs and benefits are independent for 
individual participants. Therefore, agents would either over produce (negative externalities) 
or under organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are governed by an 
efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade 
secrets, or public order.  
Principally, when the appropriability associated with a transaction is low, there is no 
pure market mode to protect and carry out that activity effectively. Nevertheless, the 
respecting others rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting” additional rights to 
others (needed transactions carried) could be governed by a “good will” or charity actions. 
For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives have emerged driven by 
the competition, farmers’ preferences for eco-production, or responds to public pressure for a 
sound eco-management [Bachev 2010a]. In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly 
satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require significant costs.  
If appropriability is low and transactions are strongly specific (for a particular 
customer), the only way to carry them out is to integrate transactions (in house production, 
trade secrets) or elaborate the effective form for securing a credible commitment (joint 
investments, interlinks). Some private modes could be employed if a high frequency (a 
 17
pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual assets dependency (thus incentive to 
cooperate) exists12. In these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective 
agreements, close-membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, 
internal organization etc. are used.  
Serious transaction difficulties occur (and may block transacting) when they are 
associated with low appropriability but require significant specific or universal investments, 
and are characterized with low frequency and high uncertainty13. The incidental character of 
transactions between same agents makes the designing and maintenance costs for a special 
(private, collective) large-members organization for dealing with low appropriability very 
high (“free-riding” problem). Thus, there is a strong need for a “third-party” public 
(Government, local authority, international assistance) intervention in order to make such 
activity possible or more effective – public organization, public contracts, mandatory fees, 
introduction of new property right etc.  
 
Principle modes for effective organization 
 
Next step is to evaluate the effective potential of alternative economic organizations: to 
minimize bounded rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty surrounding transactions; for 
appropriation and protection of absolute and contracted rights (and associated private 
benefits and investment) from possible opportunism; to recover long-term costs for 
organizational development through a high frequency of transactions; to explore economy of 
size and scale on specific capital etc.  
Individual organizations have different comparative advantages and disadvantages to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs of transactions with specific critical dimensions.  
In general, the internal organization has advantage for governing transaction with high 
uncertainty and specificity (dependency) of assets, since it diminishes the bounded rationality 
and protects investments from outside opportunism.  
Contrary, transactions with high certainty (bounded rationality is not important) and 
universal character of assets (opportunism can not be realized since transaction can be 
executed with another partner without additional costs) can be carried across free market 
without encountering costs for development of a special private mode.  
Private organization is effective only for transactions with high recurrence between 
partners, since occasional (single) transactions do not let recovering ("payback" on) 
investment for development of a special governance mode (mechanisms for coordination, 
stimulation, dispute resolution; formal registration etc.).  
Finally, markets and private forms are appropriate for transactions with high 
appropriability, since they would recover invested resources through exchange. For 
transaction with a low appropriability the private rights cannot be protected or they are 
enforced with extremely high costs. Thus, such transactions could be effectively governed 
                                                   
12 For instance, inter-dependency between a dairy farm and a milk processor in a remote region (capacity and 
site dependency); or a bee-keeper and a neighboring orchard farm (symmetric dependency between needs of 
flower and needs for pollination).   
13 That is when a pay-back on investment requires “mass” consumption and “collective appropriation” of 
benefits (and risk taking). 
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either by hybrid (mixed public-private, quasi-public) or the entirely public forms for 
organization. 
Since transactions have different critical dimensions and the governance forms have 
different comparative advantages the operationalisation of the concept is done by: “aligning 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in 
their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” 
[Williamson]. 
According to the combination of the specific characteristics of each activity and 
transaction, there will be different the most effective form of economic organization for that 
particular activity (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Principle modes for governing of agrarian transactions14 
            Critical dimensions of transactions 
                 Appropriability 
                     High    Low 
          Assets Specificity 
    Low    High 
            Uncertainty 
Low    High    Low   High 
           Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High Low High Low  High Low  High Low 
 
Free market  ? ?    
Special contract   ?  ?   
Internal organization  ?  ?   
Third-party  
involvement 
 ?  ?  
Public intervention       ? 
? - the most effective mode; ? - a necessity for a third party involvement 
 
Agrarian transactions with a good appropriability, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments (the partner can be changed anytime without significant additional 
costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight or classical contracts. 
Here the organization of transactions with a special form or within the farm (firm) would 
only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits.  
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and a high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. The relational 
(”neoclassical”) contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at 
outset (a high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than a specification 
                                                   
14 Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels (high-low) of the critical 
factors are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical dimensions, and thus of the 
effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc. governance). 
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of obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to 
settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of a frequent bilateral trade). 
Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be easily (costlessly) 
redeployed to another use or users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with a low uncertainty, 
high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded 
through contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of 
partners in all possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds transactions)15. Here the 
occasional character of transactions does not justify internalization within the farm (firm).   
Transactions with a high frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity (dependency), and 
appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm (internal ownership mode). For 
instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite specific to a farm, and its supply 
has to be always governed through a permanent labor contract and coupled with the 
ownership rights [Bachev 2004]. Capital investments in land are to be made on owned (or 
long-leased-in) rather than a seasonally rented land (high site and product specificity). All 
“critical” to the farm material assets will be internally organized - production of forage for 
animals; important machineries; water supply for the irrigated farming etc. While universal 
capital could be effectively financed by a market form (e.g. a bank credit), the highly specific 
investments can be only made through an internal funding (own funds, equity sell, joint 
venture).  
If the specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm 
(economy of scale and scope explored, funding made)16, then an effective governing form 
outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, 
lobbying for a public intervention.  
When a strong assets (capacity, technology, time of delivery, site, branding) 
inter-dependency with an upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to 
govern transactions through a contract mode (strong mutual interests for cooperation and 
restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective supply (procurement) contracts between 
farmers and processors are widely used in dairy, meat, vine, organic industries (symmetrical 
dependency). 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need an effective 
(ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting costs for initiation and 
maintaining of such “collective organization” is usually great (a big number of coalition, 
different interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is either 
unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That creates serious problems for the efficiency (and 
sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation, 
impossibility to “induce” a public intervention etc.  
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Here the elaboration of a 
special governing structure for private transacting is not justified, specific investments are 
not made, and activity (or restriction of activity) fails to occur at an effective scale ("market 
                                                   
15  Practically it is difficult (costly) or impossible to write a complete contract for complex transaction 
[Williamson]. 
16 Integration of transactions would either increase management costs (needs to buy from or sell to a competitor) 
or it would be loss-making comparing to outside production costs (price) competition. 
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failure" and "contract failure"). Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare transacting 
associated with a high uncertainty and appropriability.  
In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in 
transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them 
more efficient or possible at all. A particular trilateral mode is invented such as the 
neoclassical contract which arranges the “third party participation 17  and manages 
transactions with high uncertainty and asset specificity, and low frequency. Emergence and 
unprecedented development of organic farming, and systems of trade with origins and 
“fair-trade” are all good examples in that respect. There is an increasing consumer’s demand 
(a price premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products in many countries. 
Nevertheless their supply could not be met unless effective trilateral governance (including 
an independent certification and control) has been put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction (activity) is low, there is no pure 
market mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Transactions with such 
characteristics could only be governed by a “good will” or charity actions of individual 
agents, NGOs etc. 
Some private modes could be employed if a high frequency (a pay-back on investment 
is possible) and a mutual assets dependency (thus an incentive to cooperate) exists. In all 
these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, 
close-membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal 
organization etc. are used. However, emerging of special (private) large-members 
organizations for dealing with low appropriability (and satisfying the entire “social” demand) 
would be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free 
riding” problem). Therefore, there is a strong need for a third-party public (Government, 
local authority, international assistance etc.) intervention in order to make such activity 
possible or more effective [Bachev 2004].  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of low appropriability, high 
uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, 
charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, the supply of additional 
environmental protection service is very costly (in terms of production and organization 
costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial 
compensation (price-premium) of farmers by willing consumers through a pure market mode 
is also ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, massive enforcement costs etc. A 
third-party mode with a direct public involvement would make that transaction effective: on 
behalf of the consumers the State agency negotiates with individual farmers a public contract 
for “environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of various 
agents (including a direct production management), provides public payments for 
compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of negotiated terms.  
 
4. Economic boundaries of farm and agrarian organizations 
 
The Discrete structural analysis defines principle effective boundaries of diverse 
                                                   
17 in verification wine grades, certification of special (eco, fair-trade, origins etc.) products etc. 
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agrarian organizations - farms, contracts, markets etc. In addition to the (combinations of) 
critical dimensions, any analysis of efficiency of individual forms is to take into account the 
specific characteristics of participating agents and the economic, institutional, natural etc. 
environment where activity takes place. More particularly, the profound analysis of the 
efficiency has to: 
First, identify the range of feasible organizational forms for each generic mode for the 
specific context of a particular country, region, subsectors, agents etc.  
Principally, the variety of “internal organization” in agriculture includes: one-person 
farm/firm, family farm/firm, group farm/firm (partnership), cooperative, corporation, public 
farm/firm, joint venture etc.  
The corresponding forms of “free market” are: spot exchange on local/regional 
markets; classical contract, wholesale trade, direct sell on international markets etc.  
The “special contract form” could be: short-term contract, long-term contract, 
relational contract, interlinked organization, multilateral agreement etc.  
Second, determine the effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of individual forms 
on the basis of their potential to: overcome bounded rationality and transaction uncertainty, 
protect transactions and investments from hazard of opportunism, explore economy of scale 
and size on specialized and specific capital, and minimize on total (production and 
transaction) costs.  
Commonly, one-person farm/firm has zero internal transaction costs (one agent), but a 
limited possibility for investment in specialized and specific human and material capital.  
The “internal” opportunities for increasing productivity (through investments, exploring 
economy of scale and size) increases along with the extension of the members of a coalition 
(group farm, partnership). The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility 
and control on activity - direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution 
by a fiat. However, extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership 
boundaries (allowing achieving the minimum technological or agronomic requirements; 
exploration of technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs 
for development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
The separation of ownership from the management (cooperative, corporation, public 
farm/firm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting 
efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies of scale 
and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in product 
promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts and authorities. However, it 
could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, and 
adaptation.  
The cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from low capability for internal 
long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable character of shares (so 
called “horizon problem”). 
The special contract combines the potential for a greater “control” on transactions with 
possibility to explore the advantages of further specialization of activity. Nevertheless, it 
could be connected with large costs for preparing and enforcement of contracts for complex 
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occasional transactions with high unilateral dependency.  
The boundaries of agrarian markets extend along with the development of 
specialization and standardization of agrarian recourses, technologies, and products, and 
institutional conditions for protecting private (absolute and contract) rights. However, market 
governance could be associated with high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to the price 
instability, the great possibility for facing opportunistic behavior, (semi) monopoly or 
“missing market” situation etc. 
The trade-offs between the gain in the productivity/benefits and the gain in transacting 
costs of each mode would be quite different in a specific institutional, economic and natural 
environment for agents with unlike characteristics and activity (transactions) with specific 
combination of critical dimensions. Therefore, individual organizations will have quite 
different efficiency and effective boundaries. A part of the agrarian transactions will be 
effectively governed through a free market exchange; another part will be effectively 
organized through a special contract mode(s); a part of transactions will be entirely integrated 
(firm) while another portion protected though a special private organization(s) outside of 
farm gates (cooperation, association).  
At this stage of the analysis it becomes clear the inadequacy of traditional indicators for 
productivity of production costs and resources for assessing the efficiency of different 
agrarian organizations. The opposite is to be expected: it has to be a significant variation in 
the rate of profitability on investments in an agro-firm (a profit making organization) from 
the "pay-back" of expenditures and resources in a cooperative (a member oriented 
organization), a public farm (a non-for profit organization) or in a subsistence farm (giving 
opportunity for productive use of otherwise "non-tradable" resources such as family labor, 
land etc.). Indeed the later has been proven by the multiple estimates of the “efficiency” of 
different farms during transition now in all countries from Central and East Europe [Bachev, 
2004; Csáki, C. and Lerman; Gortona and Davidova; Mathijs and Swinnen]   
Traditional statistical, farming system, accountancy etc. data are little suitable to test 
and apply suggested new approach. It is necessary to (get) use a great amount of 
micro-economic data (for different type of transactions governed by divers organizations, 
and costs and benefits associated with the alternative governance modes) as well as data 
about specific (economic, institutional, natural etc.) environment in which different 
organizations evolve. The goal of such analysis is not only to test the adequacy of this new 
approach, but also to identify transaction difficulties, and suggest directions for improvement 
of public policy and business strategies. 
An attempt for comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of divers economic 
organizations in transitional Bulgarian agriculture is made by us in a separate study [Bachev 
2010b]. 
 
5. Effective forms for public intervention 
 
Steps in improving efficiency of public organizations 
 
The Discrete structural analysis let us specify the existing and emerging deficiencies in 
the organization of market and private transactions, and define the needs for public 
intervention in agrarian sector (the “economic role of government”).  
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In modern agriculture there are always some public modes put in place along with the 
diverse market and private organizations. Therefore, (ideally) it could be a case of the most 
effective (perfect) economic governance of the sector. However, usually there are a number 
of social, economic, environmental etc. challenges (problems, conflicts, failures, risks) 
associated with the agrarian development. That is why, there is a constant need for 
improvement of public organization.    
The comparative analysis is to extend to the public modes and include (Figure 5):  
First, assessment on the correspondence of the public involvement to the real needs of 
development – e.g. identified needs for a third-party intervention from Figure 4. The analysis 
is to embrace the efficiency of the entire system of governance, and identify deficiencies 
(failures, risks) in market, and private and public organizations [Bachev 2010a].  
 
Figure 5: Steps in analysis and improvement of public organizations  
 
 
 
Second, a variety of alternative modes for public intervention able to correct the 
existing (or emerging) market, private and public failures have to be identified, and their 
comparative efficiency assessed, and the most efficient one(s) selected.  
Third, assessment is to be made on the comparative efficiency of the selected public 
form to other practically possible (feasible) modes of governance such as partnership with 
private sector, fundamental property rights modernization, international cooperation etc. 
Accordingly, a new public intervention is to be initiated only if there is overall net benefit - 
when the effects are greater than additional (individual and social) costs for the third-party 
public involvement.   
Principally, public intervention is necessary for transactions with small appropriability, 
and transactions with high assets specificity and uncertainty and low frequency (Figure 4). 
Here there is no pure market or private mode for effective organization (“market failure”, 
“contract failure”, “private sector failure”) and a third part involvement (state, local authority, 
NGO, international assistance etc.) is necessary to make such transactions more efficient or 
possible at all. 
Depending on the uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for the specific investment of 
Identification of deficiencies in market, and private, and public 
organizations
Identification of needs for new public intervention
Assessing comparative efficiency of different modes for 
public intervention and selecting the best one(s)  
Assessing comparative efficiency of selected public form(s) to other feasible 
modes of governance and selecting the best mode of intervention 
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public involvement, there will be different the most effective forms (Figure 6). Generally, the 
interventions with a low uncertainty and assets specificity would require a smaller public 
organization (more regulatory modes; improvement of the general laws and contract 
enforcement etc.).  
 
Figure 6: Effective modes for public intervention in agrarian sector 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                       ←-----------------------------------→                       High 
New property rights 
and enforcements 
New regulations New 
taxes 
New assistance and 
support 
New public 
provision 
 
When uncertainty and assets specificity of the transactions increases a special contract 
mode would be necessary – e.g. employment of public contracts for provision of private 
services, public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labor contract for 
carrying out special public programs, leasing out public assets for private management etc.  
And when transactions are characterized with a high assets specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency then an internal mode and a bigger public organization would be necessary – e.g. 
permanent public employment contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in a 
specialized state agency or public company etc.  
It is essential to assess the comparative efficiency of practically (technically, 
economically, socially) possible and alternative forms of governance. Thus, the additional 
benefits (problems to be solved, risks to be overcome, new goals to be achieved), and the 
costs, and the modes for a new public intervention must be socially admissible (acceptable).  
If different forms permit achieving the same goals and tackling the same problems, 
the analysis is to focus on the selection of the mode minimizing the total (implementing and 
transacting) costs. Assessment is to comprise all costs – the direct (tax payer, assistance 
agency etc.) expenses, and the transacting costs of bureaucracy (for coordination, stimulation, 
mismanagement), and the costs for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes 
(expenses for information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes), and the costs for 
community control over and for reorganization of the bureaucracy (modernization and 
liquidation of public modes), and the (opportunity) costs of public inaction.  
Moreover, a form having the same (or less) costs as the alternatives is to be chosen if 
it provides more benefits or it is (socially, politically, technically) more preferable than other 
arrangements. If one of the possible forms provides more benefits at the expense of more 
costs, then the selection is to be made depending on whether the additional costs for that 
public intervention are socially acceptable (and feasible) or not. Similarly, if there is a single 
(only one) mode available for governing a particular intervention (achieving a certain social 
goal) it would be introduced only if associated implementing and transacting costs are 
socially admissible (and feasible). 
 
Public intervention in agrarian eco-activity  
 
Market and private sector fail to organize effectively most of the environmental 
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transactions (activity) in agriculture [Bachev 2010a]. Eco-activity and exchanges are usually 
associated with low appropriability, high asset specificity and uncertainty, and low frequency 
which necessitate a public intervention.  
There are a great variety of possible ways for public interventions in agrarian 
eco-activity (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Effective modes for public intervention in agrarian environmental 
transactions* 
New property 
rights 
Regulations Taxes Assistance and 
support 
Public 
provision 
Rights for clean, 
beautiful 
environment, 
biodiversity; 
Private rights on 
natural, biological, 
and environmental 
resources;  
Private rights for 
(non) profit 
management of 
natural resources;  
Tradable quotas 
(permits) for 
polluting;  
Private rights on 
intellectual 
agrarian property, 
origins, 
(protecting) 
ecosystem 
services; 
Rights to issue 
eco-bonds and 
shares; 
Private liability for 
polluting 
Regulations for organic farming; 
Quotas for emissions, and use of 
products and resources; 
Regulations for introduction of 
foreign species, and use of GM 
crops; 
Bans for certain activity, and use of 
some inputs and technologies; 
Norms for nutrition and pest 
management; 
Regulations for water protection 
against pollution by nitrates; 
Regulations for biodiversity and 
landscape management;  
Regulations for trading of 
protection of ecosystem services; 
Licensing for water or agro-system 
use; 
Quality and food safely standards; 
Standards for good farming 
practices; 
Mandatory (environmental) 
training; 
Certifications and licensing; 
Compulsory environmental 
labeling; 
Designating environmental 
vulnerable and reserve zone; 
Set aside measures; 
Inspections, fines and, ceasing 
activities 
Tax rebates, 
exception, 
and breaks; 
Environment
al taxation on 
emissions or 
products 
(pesticides, 
fertilizers); 
Levies on 
manure 
surplus; 
Tax or levies 
schemes on 
farming or 
export for 
funding 
innovations  
and 
extension;  
Waste tax 
Recommendation and 
information; 
Demonstration; 
Direct payments and 
grants for environmental 
actions of farms, 
farmers and community 
organizations, 
businesses; 
Preferential credit 
programs; 
Public environmental 
contracts; 
Government purchases 
(water and other limited 
resources); 
Financial and price 
support for organic and 
eco-production, and 
special origins; 
Funding of environment 
and management 
training programs; 
Assistance in farm and 
eco-associations 
Collecting fees for 
paying eco-system 
service providers 
Research and 
development; 
Extension and 
advise; 
Agro-market 
and know-how 
information; 
Agro-meteorol
ogical 
forecasts; 
Sanitary and 
veterinary 
control, 
vaccination, 
prevention 
measures; 
Specialized 
public agency 
(company) for 
important 
ecosystems; 
 Pertaining 
“precaution 
principle” 
Eco-monitoring
; 
Eco-foresight; 
Risk 
assessment 
* The environmental transactions are associated with respecting the environmental rights and 
improving the environmental performance of individual agents. 
 
Initially, the existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in the 
organization of market and private transactions have to be specified. The appropriate pubic 
involvement would be to create an environment for: decreasing the uncertainty surrounding 
market and private transactions, and increasing the intensity of exchange, and protecting 
private rights and investments, and making private investments less dependent etc.  
For instance, the State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards for 
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farm inputs and produces, certifies producers and users of natural resources, regulates 
employment relations, transfers water management rights to farms associations, sets up 
minimum farm-gate prices etc. All that facilitates and intensifies (market and private) 
transactions and increases efficiency of economic organizations.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have to 
be considered. The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified 
private rights [Bachev 2004]. In some cases, the most effective government intervention 
would be to introduce and enforce new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, 
biological, and environmental resources; rights on issuing eco-bonds and shares; marketing 
and stock trading of ecosystem services protection; tradable quotas for polluting; private 
rights on intellectual agrarian property and origins etc.  
That would be efficient when the privatization of resources or the introduction (and 
enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs (uncertainty, recurrence, 
and level of specific investment are low). That public intervention effectively transfers the 
organization of transactions into the market and private governance, liberalizes market 
competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain activities.  
For instance, tradable permits (quotas) are used to control the overall use of certain 
resources or level of a particular type of pollution. They give flexibility allowing farmers to 
trade permits and meet their own requirements according to their adjustment costs and 
specific conditions of production. That form is efficient when a particular target must be met, 
and the progressive reduction is dictated through permits while trading allows the compliance 
to be achieved at least costs (through a private governance). The later let also a market for 
environmental quality to develop18.  
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and 
utilization of resources and products – e.g. standards for labor (safety, social security), 
product quality, environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural 
resources, introduction of foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) 
contamination; a ban on application of certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for 
trading ecosystem service protection; foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and 
licensing of farm operators etc. 
The large body of environmental regulations in developed countries aim changing the 
farmers behavior and restricting the negative impact on environment. It makes producers 
responsible for the environmental effects (externalities) of their products or the management 
of products uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when a general improvement of the 
performance is desired but it is not possible to dictate what changes (in activities, 
technologies) is appropriate for a wide range of operators and environmental conditions (high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry).  
When the level of hazard is high, the outcome is certain and the control is easy, and no 
flexibility exists (for timing or the nature of socially required result), then the bans or strict 
limits are the best solution. However, the regulations impose uniform standards for all 
regardless of the costs for compliance (adjustment) and give no incentives to over-perform 
beyond a certain level.  
                                                   
18 Permits can be taken out of market in order to raise the environmental quality above the “planned” 
(by the Government) level. 
 27
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of the tax system would be the 
most effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, breaks, 
credits) are widely used to create favorable conditions for the development of certain 
(sub)sectors and regions, forms of agrarian organization, segment of population, or specific 
types of activities.  
The environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of production) 
is also applied to reduce the use of harmful substances. The later impose the same conditions 
for all farmers using a particular input and give signals to take into account the 
“environmental costs” inflicted on the rest of society.  
Taxing is effective when there is a close link between the activity and the 
environmental impact, and when there is no immediate need to control the pollution or to 
meet the targets for reduction. However, an appropriate level of the charge is required to 
stimulate a desirable change in farmers behavior. Furthermore, some emissions vary 
according to the conditions of application and attempting to reflect this in tax may result in 
complexity and high administrating costs.  
In some cases, a public assistance and support to private organizations is the best mode 
for intervention. Large agrarian and rural support and development programs have been 
widely used in all industrialized countries. They let a “proportional” development of 
agriculture and improvement of farmers welfare (“income parity”).  
The public financial support for the environmental actions is the most commonly used 
instrument for the improving environment performance of farmers. It is easy to find a 
justification for the public payments as a compensation for the provision of an 
“environmental service” by farmers. However, the share of farms covered by various 
agri-environmental support schemes is not significant. That is a result of the voluntary 
(self-selection) character of this mode which does not attract farmers with the highest 
environment enhancement costs (most intensive and damaging environment producers). In 
some cases, the low-rate of farmers’ compliance with the environmental contracts is a serious 
problem. The later cannot be solved by augmented administrative control (enormous 
enforcement costs) or introducing bigger penalty (politically and juridical intolerable 
measure).  
A disadvantage of “the payment system” is that once introduced it is practically 
difficult (“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are 
funding difficulties. Moreover, an withdraw of the subsidies may lead to further 
environmental harm since it would induce the adverse actions such as intensification and 
return to the conventional farming.  
The main critics of the subsidies are associated with their “distortion effect”, the 
negative impact on “entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, the unfair advantages to 
certain sectors in the country or industries in other countries, not considering the total costs 
(transportation and environmental costs, and “displacement effect” in other countries). It is 
estimated that the agri-environmental payments are efficient in maintaining the current level 
of environmental capital but less successful in enhancing the environmental quality.  
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to 
farmers, other agrarian and rural agents, and consumers are the most efficient form.  
In some cases, a pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) will 
be the most effective as in the case of as in case of important agro-ecosystems and national 
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parks; agrarian research, education and extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border 
sanitary and veterinary control etc. 
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of 
public intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (a governance mix) is caused by: 
the complementarities (joint effect) of the individual forms; the restricted potential of some 
less expensive forms to achieve a certain (but not the entire) level of the socially preferred 
outcome; the possibility to get an extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for 
participation in public support programs); the particularity of the problems to be tackled; the 
specific critical dimensions of the governed activity; the uncertainty (little knowledge, 
experience) associated with the likely impact of the new forms; the practical capability of 
Government to organize (administrative potential to control, implement) and fund (direct 
budget resources and/or international assistance) different modes; and not least important the 
dominating (right, left) policy doctrine [Bachev 2010a].  
Besides, the level of an effective public intervention (governance) depends on the kind 
of the problem and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be 
executed at local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require nationwide 
governance. And finally, there are activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at 
international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for 
trans-border actions (needs for a cooperation in natural resources and environment 
management, for exploration of economies of scale/scale, for prevention of ecosystem 
disturbances, for governing of spill-overs)  or consistent (national, local) government 
failures. Very frequently the effective governance of many problems (risks) requires 
multilevel governance with a system of combined actions at various levels involving diverse 
range of actors and geographical scales. 
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision etc.) modes must have built special 
mechanisms for increasing the competency (decrease bounded rationality and powerlessness) 
of the bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting the 
possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, corruption) of 
the public officers and other stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new 
assessment and communication technologies, increasing transparency (e.g. independent 
assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in the 
management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying “market like” mechanisms 
(competition, auctions) in the public projects design, selection and implementation would 
significantly increase the incentives and decrease the overall costs.  
Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all other 
modes do not work effectively [Williamson]. The “in-house” public organization has higher 
(direct and indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. 
What is more, unlike the market and private forms there is not an automatic mechanism 
(such as competition) for sorting out the less effective modes19. Here a public “decision 
making” is required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is often influenced 
by the strong private interests (the power of lobbying groups, policy makers and their 
associates, employed bureaucrats) rather than the efficiency.  What is more, widespread 
“inefficiency by design” of public modes is practiced to secure (rent-taking) positions of 
                                                   
19 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the world. 
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certain interest groups, stakeholders, bureaucrats etc. [Williamson]. 
Along with the development of general institutional environment (“The Rule of Law”, 
transparency) and the measurement, communication etc. technologies, the efficiency of 
pro-market modes (regulation, information, recommendation) and contract forms would get 
bigger advantages over the internal less flexible public arrangements.  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than the 
pure public forms given the coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority of 
cases, the involvement of farmers, farmers organizations and other beneficiaries increases 
efficiency - decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives 
for private costs-sharing, reduces management costs etc. [Bachev 2004]  
For instance, a hybrid mode would be appropriate for carrying out the supply of 
non-food services by farmers such as the preservation and improvement of environment, 
biodiversity, landscape, historical and cultural heritages. That is determined by the farmers 
information superiority, the strong interlinks of that activity with the traditional food 
production (economy of scope), the high assets specificity to the farm (farmers competence, 
high cite-specificity of investments to the farm and land), and the spatial interdependency 
(needs for cooperation of farmers at a regional or wider scale), and not less important – the 
farm’s origin of negative externalities. Furthermore, the enforcement of most labor, animal 
welfare, biodiversity etc. standards is often very difficult or impossible at all. In all these 
cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) the private voluntary actions 
are much more effective then the mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, 
enforcement, and disputing costs.   
Anyway, if there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
(government, local authority, international assistance etc.) intervention is not introduced in a 
due time, the agrarian “development” would be substantially deformed [Bachev 2004]. Thus 
the public (Government) failure is also possible and often prevails.  
In Bulgaria, there have been a great number of bad examples for public under- and 
over-interventions in agrarian sector during post-communist transition now [Bachev 2010a; 
Bachev and Tsuji]. Consequently, a primitive and uncompetitive small-scale farming; 
predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted 
agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out all class of agrarian transactions (innovation and 
extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental goods); 
and development of a large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a result. 
Our comparative analysis let us improve the design of the new forms of public 
intervention according to the specific market, institutional and natural environment of a 
particular country, region, sub-sector20, and in terms of perfection of the coordination, 
adaptation, information, stimulation, restriction of opportunism, controlling (in short – 
minimization of transaction costs) of participating actors (decision-makers, implementers, 
beneficiaries, other stakeholders).  
What is more, it also unable us to predict likely cases of new public (local, national, 
international) failures due to impossibility to mobilize sufficient political support and 
necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies in the 
                                                   
20 The effective institutions can not be “imported“ but must be designed for the specific conditions 
of different countries, regions, sectors etc. [North]. 
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specific economic and institutional environment of a particular country, region, sub-sector etc. 
Since the public failure is a feasible option its timely detection permits foreseeing the 
persistence or rising of certain problems in agrarian development, and informing (local, 
international) community about associated risks.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In unreal economy "without institutions and transaction costs" the theory of agrarian 
organization is very simple - there are no agrarian organizations (farms, firms, cooperatives, 
contractual arrangements etc.). Here there is a single mechanism for governing (organizing, 
coordinating, stimulating) the entire economic activities - the free market. “Situation of 
efficiency” is easily achieved since agrarian agents (individuals, households, firms) 
automatically and costlessly adapt their behavior according to movements of market prices 
and changes in production technologies.  
In the real agrarian economy with diverse agents, institutions and transaction costs there 
is also place for other effective (non market) modes for organization - partnerships, , 
contracts, public and hybrid forms etc. “The old” problem of efficiency founds a "new" 
dimension through incorporation into analysis of the costs of transacting (in addition to the 
production costs). Moreover, accent is put on assessment of comparative efficiency of all 
(rather then only a part) of the alternative modes for economic organization in agriculture – 
“free market” as one extreme and “subsistent farm” or/and complete (public or private) 
hierarchy” as another poll(s). It also becomes absurd the traditional “black box” approach in 
analysis of the governing structures and productivity as an indicator for efficiency of 
different agrarian organizations. 
Our new framework helps us better understand the factors for organizational choice and 
efficiency, and the needs for public intervention in agrarian sector. The analysis of 
transaction costs identifies an immense range of “market failures” associated with 
unspecified or badly specified property rights; inefficient system for enforcement of absolute 
and contracted rights; high uncertainty and dependency of activity, low appropriability of 
rights etc.  
The economic agents deal with market deficiency developing different non-market 
forms for effective governance such as contracts, internal modes, collective actions etc.) 
Nonetheless, private sector also “fails” to safeguard individual rights and carry out certain 
activities at effective scale. That is particularly true for human and eco-rights, technological 
and infrastructural development, management of non-renewable resources, environmental 
conservation activity etc. Thus there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement in 
market and private transactions though institutional modernization, assistance, regulation, 
hybrid or in-house public organization.  
However, diverse forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency and the 
most efficient one is to be selected taking into account the overall transaction costs and 
contribution to sustainable development. Nevertheless, “public failure” is also possible, and 
inappropriate involvements, under or over-regulations, mismanagement, corruption etc. are 
widespread around the world.  
Agrarian sustainability is significantly compromised when market and private sector 
fails, and no effective public intervention takes place - imperfect institutional structure is not 
 31
reformed, delayed or bad government interventions prevail, fruitless international assistance 
dominate, and needed global governance is not established. 
Suggested new concept of efficiency is inseparable part of the new understanding of 
agrarian organizations. However, the transaction costs economizing is not only a modern 
academic concept but a real practice in the world we are living in. Here arguments such as 
“transaction costs are difficult to measure” and therefore “they will be ignored in assessment 
of efficiency” are not acceptable - not only in research works, but in the farm management 
and agrarian policies design. 
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